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Could we think of the black subject under apartheid as a refugee, and might this 
condition be the paradigmatic metaphor for thinking about the postcolonial African 
predicament of citizenship? This paper considers the xenophobic violence that occurred 
in South Africa in 2008 and recasts that event by thinking about the plight of the 
refugee as part of what it argues is a genealogy of “anxious urbanity.” This, the paper 
suggests, has deﬁned the urban subject of colonial and  apartheid  modes  of  
governmentality  and  has  consequences  for  how  we think about the postcolonial 
present of citizenship. 
 
Anx-ious 
Adj.: Uneasy and apprehensive about an uncertain event or matter1 
 
How do we think about the xenophobic violence we have seen in South Africa, most 
pronounced in May of 2008? A violence made scandalous by the photograph of the 
killing and setting alight of a Mozambican migrant worker, Ernesto Nhamuave – a 
story that ran on the front pages of almost every newspaper in South Africa? And a 
violence that produced a public human rights-based campaign amongst “civil society,” 
and also produced the rows and rows of white tents that we know as the refugee 
camp, and which the South African government was quick to want to dismantle? This 
paper is an attempt to offer a way to think about how pain and suffering invokes a 
certain kind of political subject, which might be seen as the paradigmatic metaphor for 
a postcolonial African predicament. I explore this predicament by tracing the colonial 
lineages of what I am calling an “anxious urbanity,” speciﬁcally for African populations 
in South Africa, under apartheid, in order to illuminate the contemporary predicament 
of decolonising citizenship. 
 
When the picture of the killing of Ernesto Nhamuave ran on a Monday morning in the 
daily papers, the caption and the accompanying story were silent on what happened 
after. A reporter recalled a panicked resident warning police that “Shangaans are 
being attacked.” We were told that “one plump woman […] could not contain her 
laughter […] and regaled her audience with details of the event” (“Rampaging Mobs 
Attack Foreigners,” Cape Times, May 12, 2008). This reaction to the photograph, which 
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brought laughter to some and horror to others, marked a disjuncture in how we 
imagined the post-apartheid nation and ruptured certain conceptions of it. 
 
The picture caused what we might describe as a scandal. Its scandal was out in the open 
for all to see: refugees, the most vulnerable people on this continent, were being 
attacked and killed by the poor of South Africa’s townships, who too are counted as 
amongst the most vulnerable on this continent. South African exceptionalism was 
further erased in this moment of becoming post-apartheid. Modern economies, 
globalisation and colonial empires have moved goods, capital and people for centuries, 
giving rise to tensions and animosities. More presciently, throughout colonised Africa, 
indigeneity had become a politicised matter (Mamdani 2002a). The colonial state 
distributed rewards and punishment through braiding rights, space and place into the 
foundations of colonial governmentality as indirect rule in Africa. This had the effect of 
turning origins, of where you came from, into a continuing political question. 
 
In his reﬂections on violence after colonial rule, written in 1963, Frantz Fanon observed 
with a foreboding clarity: “The colonized man will ﬁrst manifest this aggressiveness 
which has been deposited in his bones against his own people […] the colonized man 
is an envious man” (Fanon 1963, 40). Without a meaningful decolonisation of the 
society which beneﬁts all, Fanon warned, this envy in the post-independence period turns 
on outsiders: “From nationalism, we have passed to chauvinism, and ﬁnally to racism. 
These foreigners are called on to leave, their shops are burned, their street stalls 
wrecked […] We observe a permanent seesaw between African unity, which fades 
quicker and quicker into the mists of oblivion” (41). 
 
When the violence of 2008 broke out, I was part of a research team hastily 
assembled to look into the matter (Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa 
2008).2 The dominant discourse through which the plight of the victims was articulated 
in what is called “civil society” in South Africa – the NGO sector in particular – was 
through a recourse to various international conventions on human rights which 
foregrounded the subject as a victim and the problem as suffering. This is, we might say, 
the hegemonic discourse through which pain and suffering is mediated in our post-Cold 
War political present. I am using suffering here to describe the way in which an 
experience of a wrong is mediated through a discourse that lodges it in the abstraction of 
an individuated body. When “natural rights” becomes secularised as “human rights,” the 
violation of bodily integrity is considered a human rights violation. This, as Samuel 
Moyn has argued (2010, 7), has become the hegemonic discourse through which to 
name a wrong in the contemporary world: 
 
The ideological ascendancy of human rights in living memory came out of a combination 
of separate histories that interacted in an unforeseeable explosion. Accident played a 
role, as it does in all human events, but what mattered most of all was the collapse of 
prior universalistic schemes, and the construction of human rights as a persuasive 
alternative to them. 
 
When the residents of informal settlements expelled foreign nationals from these 




because the urban refugee of apartheid – the anxious urban subject, a subject rendered 
migrant or illegal – is the anticipation of this subject position. Now, betwixt and 
between, the United Nations intervened, along with the South African government, to 
set up refugee camps. The South African government adopted a policy designed to 
prevent the existence of any enduring formally constituted refugee camp. It decreed that 
those in the temporary refugee camps be “reintegrated” to the informal settlements they 
had ﬂed from. Those who resisted reintegration would face deportation. Reintegration 
was not thought of as an organised or institutionalised process, but simply as an 
injunction to return. Mindful of the status of the camp as a site of care, and the 
possible quandary of the consequences of creating permanent temporary camps, the 
South African government was in haste to dismantle urban camps before its occupants 
might make claims to be citizens who seek both representation and care. It was already 
having enough of a problem with controversy around its existing facility for 
administering undocumented migrants, the Lindela Repatriation Centre.3 After some 
protest by NGOs, these temporary camps were allowed to endure slightly longer than 
the two-month period decreed; and a year later, in May 2009, the provincial 
government of the Western Cape applied for the eviction of 461 refugees in two camps 
in the province.4 
 
What might be at stake here in this anxiety – if we think of this violence not singularly 
from the vantage point of the economic, nor from the vantage point of the victim of 
human rights, but from the vantage point of colonial governmentality – is the 
incomplete decolonisation that Fanon had signalled. To consider this, I will revisit the 
politics of pain, suffering and belonging in apartheid South Africa in order to grasp 
the politics of refuge in relation to citizenship, forced removals and the law. Rather 
than focus on the exceptional violence of apartheid, my concern is to consider the 
relationship between a present violence against foreigners and the violence inherent in 
the legal foundations of apartheid. It is here that we ﬁnd the will to administer groups 
by recasting their legal status, and to recast that status in relation to who would have 
the right to citizenship and who would be an anxious urban or migrant dweller. 
 
If the military camp of national liberation produces the “cadre,” or for the settler colonial 
state the “terrorist,” the apartheid township produced the reluctant rural subject 
resistant to becoming a Bantustan foreigner. The refugee camp produces another kind 
of subject: the victim, a target that should not be made to die, but the subject that must 
be made to live. In other words, the object of care. The camp, like the townships in this 
sense is a site of biopolitical displacement, and the site of pain and suffering. It is here 
that the question of the political subject, and the right of the political subject to have 
rights, or to be a refugee who is represented by others, becomes apparent. 
 
The German political theorist Hannah Arendt drew our attention a long while ago to 
the “perplexities” of human rights, when she observed that the recourse to human 
rights, which transcended membership of a national political community, could only 
be accessed through membership of that community in the ﬁrst instance. In other words, 
one had to have the right to have human rights, a right that could only be granted and 




resonated uncannily with an appeal for the rights of animals, rendering the human 
without speech (Arendt 1973, 278): 
 
No paradox of contemporary politics is ﬁlled with a more poignant irony than the 
discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on 
regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights which are enjoyed only by citizens of the 
most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves. 
 
There is a disjuncture between what Arendt gestures to as the “rightless themselves” and 
those most prosperous. But let us adapt Arendt to speak to an African condition – to say 
that we are not talking about the “rightless” in this instance, but  to different ways in 
which rights are being engaged, claimed and protected. And that rather than between a 
ﬁrst world and a third world, or a coloniser and colonised, or developed and 
underdeveloped as discrete entities, we are talking about geographically proximate but 
economically, socially and culturally distinct communities of apartheid within the 
same state. In this Manichean world, some are asserting and claiming their rights 
themselves. And some are asserting and claiming rights on behalf of others, mediating 
between these worlds. There is therefore, with repetition and difference, what we might 
call the desire to judicialise political discontent. That is to say, constitutionalism corrals 
politics and its forms of discontent into legal-juridical channels and discourses. If the 
anxious urban subject of apartheid had its advocates to campaign on their behalf, 
then the anxious urban subject of post-apartheid ﬁnds its mediator in the advocacy of 
NGOs. In historical context, these are signiﬁcant political practices, which are not to 
be undervalued in any way. However, they do put into play effects that have 
important implications for how democracy is lived, particularly where the desire and 
the practice exist in the space of a normalised disjuncture that characterises most of the 
postcolonial world (Chatterjee 2006). 
 
The French philosopher Jacques Rancière (2004) has more recently suggested that 
Arendt’s critique of human rights “depoliticizes” human rights. Rancière offers instead a 
more tactile conﬁguration that opens up the spaces for a politics, of what he calls 
“dissensus,” produced through a process of political subjectivisation. Mindful of this 
critique, it remains however worth thinking about these instances of violence in relation 
to a legacy of rights on this continent. Let us recall that for the political subject of 
colonial modernity, rights belonged to non-natives, not natives. And non-natives were 
races.5 
 
In the following section of the paper, I describe an autobiographical narrative of law in 
relation to  apartheid  violence. I  do so in  order to draw  attention to  an account of law 
that renders apartheid as its exceptional violence rather than as an everyday legality, 
an everyday legality that also happened to be declared a crime against humanity. My 
main concern here is to draw attention to the most pernicious element of apartheid, 
which was also the feature that made apartheid “a generic form of the colonial state”: 
its desire to denationalise the majority of the population, resulting in the consequence of 
millions of mass forced removals of subject African populations from urban areas. This 
was the desire to resolve the native question by rendering the majority both foreign and 




of anxiety, an unsettled malady of being on the cusp of criminality. It is in this logic, I 
suggest, that a number of lineages are put into play in the ﬁeld of political identity 
through which the xenophobic violence of 2008 should be approached. 
 
Apartheid’s refugees 
The declaration of apartheid as a crime against humanity in 1965 described four key 
features that rendered apartheid such a crime: ﬁrstly, by denationalising the majority, 
making them foreigners and migrants; secondly, by denying the majority political 
participation; thirdly, by denying the majority self-determination; and lastly, by 
transacting the previous three elements through brute and systematic use of force. In 
other words, the resolution emphasised sovereignty and its denial. Its focus was on the 
colonial features of apartheid. Force itself was considered as the consequence of the 
latter. It was an effect of the attempt to implement colonial policies. In contrast to this 
view, a particular kind of critique of apartheid evolves to take a different view on the 
wrong of apartheid. It takes “racial discrimination” rather than self-determination and 
the right to sovereignty as its key focus. And it comes to focus on force – its victims 
and its perpetrators – as the most visible wrong of apartheid. 
 
This critique of apartheid I describe as a human rights-derived critique, and it is the 
hegemony of this critique during the latter years of the anti-apartheid struggle that, I 
would contend, comes to frame the way in which the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) comes to interpret its mandate. The result is, as Mahmood Mamdani 
(2002c) has argued, is we have come to a conclusion that there were 22,000 victims 
of gross violations of human rights committed under apartheid, a rather small number 
in proportion to the millions who were victims of the colonial features of apartheid, the 
features that targeted collective identities, through race and ethnicity, rather than 
individual victims of exceptional violence. It is often over-looked that the Population 
Registration Act of 1950 did not just divide South Africa into the taxonomic categories of 
race; it divided the population by ethnicity, too.6 Black South Africans were to be 
ethnic subjects, while the rest would be racially classiﬁed. Ethnic groups lived under 
customary law, and races lived under civil law. Races had access to rights in the civil 
realm of civil society. Subjects, in the most ambitious dreams of apartheid’s 
proponents, would not be South African citizens, but rather belong politically to the 
homelands and therefore would not have access to civic rights. They could live in white 
South Africa, but they could not belong there nor have rights there. In his 1964 book 
on the Pondoland Revolt, Govan Mbeki, the Eastern Cape intellectual, political 
prisoner and senior ANC leader, set out the challenge for the South African state with 
remarkable lucidity  (Mbeki [1964] 1984, 37–38): 
 
The problem was plain – apartheid had to ﬁnd a new way to administer Africans, 
because the pressure for more rights was growing too strong a challenge. […] The 
traditional system in South Africa had been one of direct rule: White government 
ofﬁcials sat over Chiefs. Everyone knew that the Commissioner was the boss. Yet now 
the White government ofﬁcial has become too visible and accessible a target for anti- 
government action. The need was clearly to devise a system under which the Africans 




Indirect rule had been carefully evolved by Lord Lugard for the British colonies in 
Africa; Nigeria and the former Gold Coast had been governed this way. 
 
Delivering the ﬁrst Ernie Wentzel Memorial Lecture (1987),7 the senior South African 
advocate, Sydney Kentridge QC, dwelt at length in the opening of his talk on the ethics 
and ideological beliefs that the late Ernie Wentzel had come to stand for. Wentzel, he 
noted, “held strong beliefs about the law and about the society in which he practiced 
law. […] He detested racism, white or black, and he detested Fascism, whether of the 
left or the right. Above all,” noted Kentridge, “he believed in individual rights and  
individual  choices.”  Holding  these  beliefs,  recalled Kentridge,  would  mean that  it  
was  “inevitable” that  Wentzel  would  become an the government, and “inevitable too, 
that in his profession he should the government, and “inevitable too, that in his 
profession he should be a forceful defender of the victims  of government policies” 
(1987, 11). This inevitable conﬂict and oppositional stance would lead to a three-
month spell of detention without trial for the advocate who opposed the laws of the 
government during the 1960 State of Emergency. 
 
In this recounting of the life of Ernie Wentzel, a life held up as exemplary for its 
principled, unwavering and courageous defence of the law, Kentridge, who viewed 
himself no doubt as sympathetic and following in the vein of Wentzel’s example of 
what law should do and be, was upholding a certain normative conception of what it 
meant to be a lawyer. This was a question of deep deliberation amongst a minority 
of lawyers and judges in South Africa, articulated as: what would their “role” be in 
such a context? (Steytler 1987; Adam 1988; Friederichs 1990; Wacks 1984). As we saw, 
Wentzel was lauded for not being an “ideological ﬁgure”; he eschewed the political, 
whether of the right or the left. His vision of the law is neither of place nor time, 
neither partisan nor parochial, but is presented as universal, underpinned by the 
dictum of neither fear nor favour, committed only to itself and the imperatives 
imminent to this. Of course, Wentzel and Kentridge were drawing on a particular 
sensibility here that is central to our understanding of the modern state that derives 
from an understanding of law as, in its Kantian formulation, “the highest form of 
reason.” It is also an understanding of law as a civilisational marker that embodies 
within it rights that derive from a distinct but dialogical relationship between “natural 
rights,” and “positive law,” upon which social contract theory as the foundational 
“myth” of the modern state rests. This is most starkly exempliﬁed in key texts of 
Enlightenment thinkers like Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan ([1651] 1985), and John 
Locke’s Two Treatise of Government ([1689] 1993) as rationales for the emergence of 
the modern regime of sovereign law.8 It is the writings of the latter, in particular, that 
have come to be seen as canonical to the foundations of liberalism. 
 
This account of law and the modern state takes the autobiography of an evolutionary 
narrative at its face value and brackets, to the extent that it is possible, the 
entanglements and complicated relationship between liberalism, colonialism and empire. 
What is crucial though is that the tension between the universal claims of liberalism 
and its particular, and now well-documented, categorical exclusions, are central to the 
anxiety that motivates the human rights lawyers, particularly in the South African 




for a distinction between a notion of empire and colony that is worth bearing in mind. 
On the one hand, we may refer to a history of imperial rule, which describes a practice 
and rationality that exterminates aboriginal populations;9 at the same time, as Mehta 
argues, there is also a liberal notion of empire which is predicated on various 
assumptions of “tutelage” and kinship. It is this notion of colonialism that views the 
native population as the target of interventions to re-arrange cultures and identities 
towards an image of progress and civilisation. It is this latter teleological sensibility that I 
am concerned with here in relation to a view of law, more particularly in the attendant 
legal subject–citizen that arises from the political community founded on these social 
evolutionist liberal principles. In it resides a triumphalist and self-vindicating legal 
narrative that absorbs its paradoxes, contestations and violence over time. But, as 
Mehta notes, the work of criticism is to  render  visible  and  think  through  the  
implications  of  these  paradoxes  and tensions: 
 
The facts of political exclusion – of slaves, of women, and of those without sufﬁcient 
property to exercise either suffrage or real political power – over the past three and a 
half centuries must be allowed to embarrass the universalistic claims of liberalism. 
(Mehta 1999, 76)10 
 
For Hobbes, as we know, the state of nature is one in which “men” ﬁnd themselves if 
not in war, then in the permanent disposition towards war, where the condition of 
“man” is said to be “solitary, nasty, and brutish” ([1651] 1985, 9). This violence lacks a 
legal-moral character, since it is without a normative boundary for the subject to be 
within or to transgress. It is only with the arrival of an exterior and common law that 
such a character can be given to both the disposition and more particularly, the 
action, which now has a line over which to traverse, with consequences: “till they 
know not a law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know; nor 
can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it” (187).11 
 
The redeeming feature of human beings, in this schematic metaphysics of the shift 
from the “state of nature” to political society, is the endowment of “reason.” Through 
the capacity to reason, two imminent ideas are revealed: the disposition towards a 
condition of “liberty” is considered a natural right; secondly, the exercise of that liberty, 
understood in its negative sense as the “absence of external impediments” undermines, 
through the insecurity that arises out of the equal right to wage private war, the ﬁrst 
right (189). In other words, it negates the freedom to be free. This Right of Nature (Jus 
Naturale) brings into being therefore a general state of insecurity, based on the 
exercise of private reason, leading to the condition of man as “nasty, short and brutish.” 
And it is from the private reason of liberty that law as obligation emerges. Law is 
therefore at odds with Natural rights, argued Hobbes, “like obligation is at odds with 
Liberty” (189). The distinction between Jus (Right) and Law (Obligation) is the basis of 
a form of sociality through which the “individual” can protect and enjoy the rights that 
are put into question in  the absence of a “common law.”12 As Hobbes describes it: 
 
That a man be willing when are so too, as farre forth, as for Peace, and defence him- 




with as  much liberty against other men, as he would allow  only against himself. 
([1651] 1985, 188–190) 
 
In this reworking of the Biblical injunction “doing unto others,” it is the self that is 
placed at the centre of the “motivation” for the transfer of absolute rights to the 
sovereign. Reasonable men would thus see that they had to give up some of their rights 
to everything and to protect themselves in order to live in Peace, not War. However, 
because men are governed by the “Passions,” they would revert to their natural ways if 
they saw advantage in a situation. Hence the need not only to agree by word, but also to 
agree by action to transfer their natural rights to an Authority, for: “Covenants, 
without the Sword, are but Words, and no strength to secure man at all” (Hobbes 
[1651] 1985, 192, 201–202). This “covenant,” in the form of the “social contract,” is 
therefore to be protected by the threat of force, and mediates the relationship between 
the Authority, “the commonwealth” or state, and the “citizen” as the embodiment of 
rights and obligation and allows for the distinction to be made between that which is 
legal and that which is illegal: “whatever I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break” 
(198). The making of a covenant, the agreement to be governed in actions by a 
common Law therefore creates “obligations,” and creates “injustice” as Sin Jure (191): 
 
And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of JUSTICE. For 
where no Covenant has preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man 
has right to everything; and consequently no action can be Unjust. But when a Cove nant 
is made, to break it is Unjust: And the deﬁnition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not 
Performance of the Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just. 
 
Justice and injustice are therefore premised on the upholding of the laws of the 
covenant. More so, for Hobbes, as I have noted above, the basis of these laws of the 
covenant, if they are to not be mere “words,” must have behind them the capacity of 
force: 
 
Therefore, before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some 
coercive Power, to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the 
terror of some punishment, greater beneﬁt they expect by the breach of their covenant. 
(ibid.) 
 
The very naming of justice itself is therefore, in this genealogy, premised on the 
existence of the creation of security through the ordering of violence, not as arbitrary, 
private and random, but as public, regularised and knowable, through law, and 
therefore, administered as the upholding of rights or the righting of wrongs, under the 
newly inaugurated name of “justice.” 
 
Later, Locke, in the Two Treatises of Government ([1689] 1993), was to take the 
social contract theory as the basis of government further. Drawing on a more 
optimistic view of the state of nature, where violence was present in potential rather than 
manifestation and in disagreement with Hobbes’s (and Robert Filmer’s) centralised 
commonwealth despot of the Leviathan, Locke argued that accepting a centralised all-




mischiefs may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are content, nay think it safety, to 
be devoured by lions” (53). As an alternative, Locke proposed a separation of powers 
within the commonwealth, with the Legislative and Executive functions bound by the 
rules upheld by the Judiciary. What Locke shared with Hobbes was the belief that the 
commonwealth, or government, was created not to protect its own interests but 
through an imminent revelation of reasoned access to knowledge, which would allow 
for the exercise of pre-political natural rights – in his case, the right to life, to liberty 
and to property – through a common law. These rights to life, liberty and property are 
God-given rights and are knowable and discernable to those with the capacity for 
reﬂection and reason.13 Again, like Hobbes, it is reason – and therefore the 
assumption of the possession of the capacity to reason – that reveals the existence of 
natural rights, not dependent on time and space, but “writ in the hearts of all 
mankind” (86).14 As he was to argue, drawing on Christianity, “God, who hath given 
the world to men in common, hath also given him reason to make use of it to the 
best advantage of life and convenience” (127). There is an important caveat of course 
to note here: not all possess the capacity to reason. He qualiﬁed the statement, by 
remarking that whilst God had indeed given the “world to men in common,” this 
should not be taken to mean he meant for it to remain in common or uncultivated: 
“He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, and labour was to be his title to 
it” (131). 
 
The conception of an independent judiciary, it is argued, arises from this conception of 
law, which creates a distinction between law and the realm of politics. Natural law, in 
its secularised version, makes claim to a set of rights against which the realm of the 
political give form, are judged by, and have to conform to. These are constituted as 
“fundamental” rights over which judicial interpretation exercises sovereignty. Whilst 
evident in Greece and in the uncodiﬁed rules of the Roman Republic, in its modern 
form Locke and more particularly, the French philosopher Montesquieu ([1777] 1989) 
provides the intellectual authority for the idea of a separation of powers.15 
 
I am not casting aspersions on those who did and do use the law to protect legal space 
for black subjects to exist in white South Africa or to protect migrant refugees. Nor I 
am casting doubts on the ethics or political imperative to catalogue and document in 
order to provide legal evidence of human rights violations. What I am drawing attention 
to are the ways in which subjects are constituted, both as victims and as saviours; and 
how these come to have political effects that might be quite unforeseen or unintended 
or contingent, and yet shape the outcomes or the terms on which a wrong comes to be 
righted. The recourse to human rights during the anti-apartheid struggle, articulated 
within the legal realm, comes to make it entirely thinkable to constitute apartheid at 
the TRC as a series of individualised wrongs, committed against individuals by 
individuals. 
 
Kentridge focused his subsequent comments on the increasingly pernicious effects of 
racialised segregation and the willingness of the majority of judicial appointees to accept 
the political nature of the appointments, as well as the legislation they were 
implementing. Taken as an example of a sentiment, Kentridge’s speech also describes 




emerged in opposition to the all-encompassing legislative framework of the apartheid 
state from 1948 onwards and from which the emergence of the recourse to human rights 
law in South Africa drew its vigour.16 
 
In 1972, the Legal Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid 
Society (Spro-Cas) released a report titled Law, Justice and Society (Randall 1972). 
The report comprised a series of individually authored papers, described by the 
Commission’s Secretary, John Dugard, as an attempt to “create an awareness on the part 
of the legal profession and the lay public of the incompatibility of apartheid’s legal 
order with the ethical principles upon which Western legal systems are based” (Randall 
1972, 2). John Dugard had become one of the most eminent South African scholars and 
advocates of human rights with a growing international prominence.17 Spro-Cas itself 
was a project that had its origins not only in the legal fraternity, and it was funded 
by the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of South Africa. 
 
The Spro-Cas Legal Commission’s report converges on two universalising ethical 
domains:  a Christian  ethic, premised on the normative question  of whether apartheid 
was consistent with being a Christian, and a secular legal ethic, premised on whether 
apartheid was consistent with the progressivist ideals of Western law.18 The opening 
paragraph of the report gives a genealogy of South African common law as derivative of 
a “blend of principles.” These derive from Roman-Dutch law, as well as principles of 
English common law. But it also notes that this law is: 
 
not merely a product of the legal genius of Rome and the Netherlands and the 
experience of English law; it is also the product of Judeo-Christian philosophy, the 
legal manifestation of Western Christian civilization. The South African common law 
reﬂects the ethical values of Western society in its detailed body of laws and customs, 
promoting, through the instrument of the law, respect for the individual – his life, 
liberty, family and basic freedoms – and equality before the law. (3) 
 
In this narrative of the location of the historical and cultural ﬁliality of law, we are 
beginning to see the image of a certain conception of the role of law, its genealogy and 
its legal subject. In other words, it is a narrative of where the law that we value comes 
from, how it evolves, and where it places those who remain faithful to it, both ethically, 
but also within a geo-spatial imaginary. Its unstated premise is that this is a version of 
law that is in Africa but not of Africa. This is described as the “heritage” that had to be 
defended (3). At its normative core is a rights-bearing individual, a familiar ﬁgure 
embodied in liberalism’s political subject. The Legal Commission report is concerned 
principally therefore with how the policies of the government’s legislation and its 
practices impacted on the universal enjoyment of these “Judeo-Christian” values by 
individual citizens. Do all citizens enjoy their individual rights, are they free and equal, 
and do they have unfettered access to the law? This narrative of law embeds itself ﬁrmly 
therefore in a “Western” genealogy and at the same time ascribes to this particularity a 
universal purchase. 
 
There is an important difference in the critique of apartheid that emerges at this point. 




aspects: denationalisation, political participation, self-determination and force. In 
contrast to this view, the South African human rights-derived critique of apartheid 
evolves to take a different view on the wrongs of apartheid. In its view “racial 
discrimination” rather than self-determination and the right to sovereignty are the key 
feature. It comes to focus on force – its victims and its perpetrators – as the most 
visible wrong of apartheid. The idea of a “white South Africa,” surrounded by 
“homelands” for the various “tribes,” would require a violence of immense scale – the 
forced removals and relocations, the control and regulation of movement, the policing 
of boundaries, all of which, if the regime was to be a bastion of “Western civilisation,” 
would be done through law. A series of laws were placed on the statute books, which 
had a threefold aim: to create a nationally applied and imposed singular order of law 
which legally classiﬁed the population by race and ethnicity; to create the legal 
framework for two modes of political authority, one for natives and one for race 
groups; and to create the legal framework for the ethically and racially ordered 
provision of social life and social welfare. At the interstices of these bifurcated zones 
of belonging and exclusion were those who make the case for the universal, from 
various foundational grounds – religious, moral, ideological, political, ethical and legal. 
It was for this latter group in particular, that a recourse to human rights would appeal, 
since it could make visible, and bring into question the developmental claims of the 
Nationalist Party-led government after 1948 by demonstrating the systematic and 
widespread nature of the violations the implementation of these policies had on the 
individual as a subject of suffering, in other words, as a victim. The tension here for 
human rights lawyers is that modern legal rights rest on the metaphysically derived 
notion of a set of rights which are immanent and pre-political. These are translated in 
thought, through concepts and mythologies (and secularised) as the foundations of 
modern positive law. There is the law that is (sacred, divine, God-given) and there is 
the law that emerges from the labour of thought as the product of reason, the law 
that is not “natural” but human – positive law. When human rights lawyers endeavour 
to critique the legality of the apartheid state and its laws, how would they pit one form 
of positive law against another? 
 
The electoral victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948 brought to a colonial and 
segregationist history a reﬁnement of the idea of what Partha Chatterjee (2006) has 
called “the rule of colonial difference”  – the permanence and radical otherness of the 
native which required a different path to self-improvement and development, via the 
structures of tradition and custom. It was in this context that the rise to hegemony in 
the mediation of pain and suffering of human rights law and the ﬁgure of the human 
rights lawyer must be located. In its institutional forms, a related mediating 
institution between the (white) lawyer – the “bridge builder”  – and the (black) subject 
of apartheid is the “Advice Ofﬁce” or the Advice Bureau. An archetypical example of this 
is the formation and history of the Black Sash, a non-governmental organisation.19 In 
this realm, “racial discrimination” became the dominant marker of what apartheid was 
about. Race was seen in this rationality as  the grounds upon which individuals were 
denied the universal by their place in the epidemiological taxonomy and which 
condemned them to  their  particularity.  They were thus excluded from liberalisms’ 
universal capaciousness. To correct this exclusion, the modern political subject could 




mediating ﬁgures of law – those considered citizens with rights – on behalf of those 
considered non-legal – the subject races of apartheid. This mode of critique establishes 
an idiom and a style of evidentiary practice that requires not only a corporeal subject of 
suffering, but also an empirically veriﬁable corporeal agent of pain, a perpetrator, which 
a skillful lawyer could bring into the same orbit with the victim by linking the two in 
order to demonstrate culpability. It is this genealogy of speaking about pain and 
suffering that comes to hegemony through its capacity to speak, as racial citizens, in a 
language and in a way that frames the wrong of apartheid as racial discrimination and 
which ﬁnds a global traction in and through a universalised liberal subject as its 
index. 
 
By the late 1970s, the major political challenge facing the apartheid state, following the 
1976 uprisings, is that apartheid’s grand plan to denationalise the native subject was 
brought into crisis. State reform measures in the period thereafter seek to address this 
challenge through a reconﬁgured conception of local government designed to co-opt a 
layer of black urban leadership in townships. Importantly, and with signiﬁcant 
consequences for the counter-insurgent aims underpinning the hopes of the state, the 
regulation of black life under this reformed local government system could not 
distinguish and demarcate the residential life of black South Africans along ethnic lines 
within South Africa, as it did in the homelands. Urban African townships were a 
heterogeneous mix (this is not to say that socially there were not ethnicised spatial 
enclaves within townships decided on by Africans themselves). The state had to 
contend now with a spatial mode of control in its regulation of life in African townships. 
It had to govern native life through the corporatised identity of blackness, rather than 
its preferred taxonomic classiﬁcation of Africans as multiple ethnicities as it had under 
the Native Authorities Act and other customary law stipulations. This forced it to shift 
slightly from its imaginary of the bifurcated vision of apartheid, divided between racial 
citizens and ethnic subjects. It had also therefore to ﬁnd an alternative mode of 
regulation and control, of law and order, if it could not hope to govern urban African 
life through the “decentralised despotism” of the chief. It was conceding the legitimate 
right of Africans to be resident in “white South Africa,” rather than enforcing their 
status as anxious temporary sojourners, and therefore permanent potential criminals 
for merely being present in an urban setting. The anxious urban native subject 
ultimately, and politically, makes a claim not to be constituted as a victim whose pain 
and suffering is mediated by the citizen who can access legal claims. In other words, 
for the human rights lawyer, the urban native subject is the refugee, the person who 
does not have the right to have rights. For the anxious urban black subject, the political 
demand is different – it is the demand to make residency the grounds for citizenship. 
This is the paradigmatic politics of the township: to transform precariousness into 
permanence, insecurity into belonging, refugee into citizen. 
 
Conclusion 
Forced removals, and the creation of homelands that are the spaces for the existence of 
apartheid subjects, rather than its citizens, share with the refugee camp then its key 
feature: the camp, like the homeland Bantustan, and the township where those forcibly 
evicted are relocated, is a site of displacement, and the location of pain and suffering. It 




South Africa through “community” initiatives, like the Lwandle Migrant Labour 
Museum on the outskirts of Cape Town,20 or as part of an unofﬁcial memorialisation. 
This initiative seeks to mark the displacement and narrate the pain and suffering that 
arises from the desire to have the native be a subject that migrates into the urban 
area, but does not belong there. The condition of the black subject under apartheid 
might be described as the condition of the refugee. And like the refugee in the camp, the 
anxious urban native South African increasingly comes to be constituted within a certain 
mode of critique that arises against this condition, as a victim, and a target that is the 
object of care. 
 
Like the refugee in the camp around which an entire discourse of pain and suffering 
emerges and around which humanitarian technologies and humanitarian beings act, 
the refugee requires its advocates. These often take the form of international NGOs who 
mediate the pain and suffering of the refugee through a discourse of care which 
universalises the condition of the victim across time and space as an abstracted human 
rights violation. So too did apartheid’s ethnic subjects come to ﬁnd themselves 
increasingly being mediated as victims of pain and suffering by their own advocates – 
quite literally advocates of law. The lawyers and paralegal community that came into 
being to draw attention to, and ﬁght the case of, the victims of apartheid’s most 
brutal aspects – its will to denationalise the majority and to reorder belonging and 
territory. Those who were racially  classiﬁed  had access to civil law and could make a 
case on behalf of those who were ethnically subjected to the violence and insecurity of 
a precarious urban existence. Both the discourse of care that emerges around the 
refugee in the camp and the discourse of law that emerges around the black subject 
proclaim themselves non-political. Humanitarianism asserts care in ethical and 
biomedical terms. It constitutes the victim in universal terms abstracted from history, 
identity, and politics. Law narrates its autobiography in a similar fashion. Like care, 
law is something to be administered. It holds on to a self-representation that divests 
law of a politics.21 
 
Another way of looking at the violence that characterised South Africa’s townships 
under late apartheid would be to see it as the claiming of a collective right: the right to 
belong as a citizen, based on residency – to undo a colonial braiding of space and place 
and the right to belong. These were the political claims made by formations within 
townships, which demanded self-determination and self-representation. From this 
vantage point, apartheid was its will to denationalise rather than its exceptional 
violence. In other words, the question of who could be a citizen. The category of 
native and refugee speaks then centrally to a postcolonial African dilemma. The solution 
to the desire to denationalise the indigenous in many African countries was to see justice 
as the privileging of those considered indigenous as the rights-bearing postcolonial 
political citizen. The legacy of colonial rule was to politicise indigeneity (Mamdani 1996), 
making it the ground of citizenship or for being considered a foreigner, often a refugee. 
Rather than a temporary exception, the refugee camp then becomes normalised. The 
refugee camp might then be the paradigmatic metaphor for one of our postcolonial 
dilemmas: the care of those who come from elsewhere, but who never can belong as 
long as descent rather than locality is the yardstick for rights and citizenship. A 




condition, following Rancière, then remains: when, and under what conditions, might 
the refugee be freed from the camp and transformed from the victim, the person who 
comes from elsewhere, into a citizen? It is a political question insofar as it prescribes 
the answer to the question: who can be the political subject? 
 
Acknowledgements 
Versions of this paper were presented to the 13th General Assembly of CODESRIA in 
Rabat, Morocco, the Social Factory colloquium in Cairo, Egypt, and the Makerere 
Institute for Social Research seminar series in Kampala, Uganda. I wish to thank 











































2. This was a research project of the Democracy and Governance Programme of  the 
Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa (2008). The report was not without 
its critics, and was the subject of a critical exchange between this author and the South 
African anthropologist John Sharp; cf. Sharp (2008) and Pillay (2008). 
3. An account of this controversy can be found in the report of the South African 
Human Rights Commission (2000). 
4. “Foreigners Displaced by Violence in South Africa Move into Temporary Camps.” 
The Canadian Press, accessed June 30, 2008. 
http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALe-qM5ibeZeGJbRIF2sQiMsqquz3WRICMw; 
“Camp Conditions Alarm SACC.” News24, accessed June 30, 2008. 
http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Xenophobia/0,2- 7-
2382_2346122,00.html. “Reintegration the Priority – Government.” Independent 
Online,  June  4,  2008.  http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_  
id=13&art_id=nw20080604125107561C769068; “Go Home or Go Back: Home 
Affairs.” The Times (SA), accessed June 30, 2008. 
http://www.thetimes.co.za/SpecialReports/Xenophobia/Article.aspx?id=780888 ; “No 
‘Forced Reintegration’ for Immigrants.” The Times (SA), accessed June 30, 2008. 
http://www.thetimes.co.za/SpecialReports/Xenophobia/Article. aspx?id=781999; 
“Govt: Victims of Xenophobia won’t be Deported.” Mail & Guardian, June 20, 2008. 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-06-20-govt-victims-of-xenophobia-wont-be-
deported; “Cape Town Wants to Evict Refugees.” The Times, accessed May 11, 2009. 
http://www.thetimes.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=996699. 
5. The genealogy of this argument in African colonial governmentality can be found in 
the Hamitic hypothesis. Cf. Mamdani (2002b), and also Pillay (2004). 
6. Section 5(1) notes that “Every person whose name is included in the register shall 
be classiﬁed by the Director as a white person, a coloured person or a native, as the 
case may be, and every coloured person and every native whose name is so included 
shall be classiﬁed by the Director according to the ethnic or other group to which he 
belongs.” Section 7(1) notes that “There shall, in respect of every person whose name is 
included in the register, other than native, be included in the register the following 
particulars and no other particulars […],” and it then lists a series of categories 
including age, sex, date of birth and so on. Section 7(2) in a separate subsection sets 
out the provisions for those deﬁned as “natives”: “There shall be in respect of every 
native whose name is included in the register, be included the following particulars 
[…]” and it then sets out a similar list, with a few additions: it adds “his citizenship, or 
nationality, the ethnic or other group and the tribe to which he belongs” (emphasis 
added) (Brookes 1968, 19–20). 
7. Sidney Kentridge became a senior counsel in 1965 in South Africa, and was a 
defence lawyer in some of the most signiﬁcant political trials, including the Treason 
Trial (1958– 1961); he later represented the family of the late Black Conscious leader, 
Steven Bantu Biko, at the inquest into his death in police custody in 1977. Thereafter, 
Kentridge practised law as member of the English Bar, and was appointed Queen’s 
Counsel in 1984. He served as a judge in Botswana and an Acting Justice in the 
Constitutional Court of post-apartheid South Africa. This biographical information 




of a national order of merit to Kentridge for his role as an anti-apartheid lawyer: 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/ orders_list.asp?show=395, accessed May 1, 2010. 
8. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, as well as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, are taken to 
be among the most important Enlightenment theorists of a form of government based 
on the idea of natural rights, drawing on the earlier writings of Hugo Grotius (1583–
1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694). Noting a distinction between different 
national conceptions of the natural rights concept, Waswo (1996), in his account of the 
American genealogy of the concept, as distinct from the British, argues that the early 
Puritans accepted that it was “natural” that “men” would seek liberty, but they also 
saw that it contained a threat. Writing in 1630, John Winthrop was to make a 
distinction between two forms of liberty. The ﬁrst he described as natural and the 
second as “civic” or “federal.” “The First,” he argued, “is common to man with beast 
and other creatures”; and he went on, the “exercise of this liberty makes men grow 
more and more evil and in time to be worse than brute beasts: omnes sumus licentia 
detoriores. The other kind of liberty I call civil or federal; it may also be moral, in 
reference to the covenant between God and man, in the moral law […] This liberty is 
the proper end and object of authority and cannot subsist without it” (743–744). See 
also Hussain (2003). 
9. An example of this invocation of Empire can be found in Lindqvuist (1992). 
10. The paradoxes between universal claims have been articulated in various forms. In 
the moment of imperialism, which exterminates the colonial subject, there are the 
famous debates on the right to imperium and dominum (Grovogui 1996, 17–25). For 
the latter paradoxes, see also Mommsen and de Moor (1992) and Stoler (1989a, 1989b). 
11. To clarify, when Hobbes uses “law” in lower case he refers to the concept of law in 
general, but when he speaks of “Lawes,” he is describing the particular transcendental 
law which monopolises authority over violence in the contractual justiﬁcation for 
obligation to a sovereign political authority. 
12. The Enlightenment formulation of a natural law tradition, out of which this 
conception of justice arises, draws on a number of historical precursors. In the 
genealogy of the concept in the West, it is to Aristotle that we most often turn, 
although there is some dispute about this; see Charles H. McIlwain (1932, 114–115). 
Particularly, it is to Aristotle’s distinction between distributive and corrective justice, 
the latter arising from a pre-given sense of right, which lends itself to a historically 
transcendent conception of law and right in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics and 
Rhetoric (see Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History [1987]). Plato’s conception of 
natural law entered the mainstream of Western legal thought through the Aristotelian 
commentary on the Republic by the Andalusian Muslim polymath Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes), as well as through the writings of Thomas Aquinas (Henry 1993, 39). 
13. In the genealogy of natural law, the Enlightenment interpretation is distinguished 
from the Medieval and Christian conception of jus gentium by the status of natural 
law in relation to obligation and compliance, which derives from a general acceptance, 
rather than a rule or force. This is taken up in modern law as “the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations” (see for example the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, art. 38, from the Latin principle of ius cogena erga omnes, translated 
as “law that is compelling in relation to everyone,” or “higher law” or “fundamental 




“derived from natural law,” these only carry legal force as part of a posited system: ex 
sola lege humana vigorem habent: ST I–II, q. 95.a3; see Finnis (1980), Fuller (1969). 
14. According to Carlyle (1927, 83), this ﬁnds its way into Christian doctrine on natural 
law through Cicero. 
15. This point is elaborated on in Althusser (1972), Balandier (1970, 3) and Shklar 
(1989). 
16. It was also a debate presented as a case of the particularity of Afrikaner 
nationalism’s understanding of law as moral communal values, contrasted with the 
more universalist and “progressive” orientation of liberal English-speaking white South 
Africans and the legal tradition they sought to protect; see Lewin (1963). 
17. Besides his copious writing on apartheid and human rights law, Dugard has served 
as an ad hoc Judge on the International Court of Justice and as a Special Rapporteur 
for both the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the 
International Law Commission. More recently he has been, in the latter capacity, 
investigating human rights violations, as well as the colonial and apartheid features of 
the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank, and Gaza in 
particular. For his views on the apartheid features of Israeli occupation, a transcript 
of a lecture is accessible at 
http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/d/ContentDetails/i/5240 (accessed July 3, 2010). 
18. Whilst some might suggest an incompatibility between this secular and religious 
convergence, Alain Supiot (2007) has argued convincingly that these are historically 
entwined domains of a modern rationality. 
19. BC 668 (B1.1), Manuscripts and Archives Department, University of Cape Town 
Libraries. 
20. http://www.lwandle.com/. 
21. As I have discussed above, that apartheid was legal, liberal critics argued, was an 
aberration of law rather than a calling into question of the Western legal tradition itself. 
 
Notes on contributor 
Suren Pillay is Associate Professor in the Centre for Humanities Research at the 
University of the Western Cape. His current research focuses on the contemporary 




















Adam, H. 1988. “Engineering Compliance. The Management of Dissent in South Africa.” 
In Law and Justice in South Africa, edited by J. Hund, 172–192. Cape Town: 
Center for Intergroup Studies, Institute for Public Interest Law and Research. 
Althusser, L. 1972. Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx. London: New 
Left Books. 
Arendt, H. 1973. Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Shocken. Balandier, G. 
1970. Political Anthropology. New York: Random House. 
Brookes, E. H. 1968. Apartheid: A Documentary Study of Modern South Africa. New 
York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Carlyle, A. J. 1927. A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, vol. 1. New 
York: Barnes & Noble. 
Chatterjee, P. 2006. The Politics of the Governed: Reﬂections on Popular Politics in Most 
of the World. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Fanon, F. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. 
Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Friederichs, D. O. 1990. “Law in South Africa and the Legitimacy Crisis.” 
International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 14 (2): 188–
199. 
Fuller, L. 1969. The Morality of Law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Grovogui, S. 1996. Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns and Africans: Race and Self-
Determination in International Law. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Hart, H. L. A. 1994. The Concept of Law. 2nd edition Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Henry, C. 1993. History of Islamic Philosophy. Translated by L. Sherrard and P. 
Sherrard. London: Kegan Paul. 
Hobbes, T. [1651] 1985. Leviathan. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa. 2008. Citizenship, Violence and 
Xenophobia in South Africa: Perceptions from South African Communities. 
Democracy and Governance Research Programme. Pretoria: HSRC Press. 
Hussain, N. 2003. The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Kentridge,  S.  1987. Law  and Lawyers  in  a  Changing Society:  The First  Ernie  
Wentzel Memorial Lecture. Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies. 
Lewin, J. 1963. Politics and Law in South Africa. London: Merlin Press. 
Lindqvuist, S. 1992. Exterminate the Brutes: One Man’s Odyssey into the Heart of 
Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide. New York: The New Press. 
Locke, J. [1689] 1993. The Two Treatises of Government. London: Everyman. 
Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Mamdani, M. 2002a. “Making Sense of Political Violence in Africa.” Identity, Culture 
and Politics 2 (3): 1–24. 
Mamdani, M. 2002b. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and 
Genocide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Mamdani, M. 2002c. “Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the TRC.” 
Diacritics 32 (3–4): 33–59. 




McIlwain, C. H. 1932. The Growth of Political Thought in the West: From the Greeks to 
the End of the Middle Ages. New York: Macmillan. 
Mehta, U. S. 1999. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British 
Liberal Thought. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Mommsen, W. J., and J. A. de Moor, eds. 1992. European Expansion and Law: The 
Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th and 20th Century Africa 
and Asia. Oxford: Berg. 
Montesquieu, C. [1777] 1989. Spirit of the Laws, edited by A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller, 
and H. S. Stone. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Moyn, S. 2010. The Last Utopia. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Pillay, S. 2004. “Where Do You Belong? Natives, Foreigners and Apartheid South 
Africa.” African Identities 2 (2): 215–232. 
Pillay, S. 2008. “Fortress SA? A Response to John Sharp.” Anthropology Today 24 (4): 
22. Rancière, J. 2004. “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 103 (2–3): 297–310. 
Randall, P., ed. 1972. Law, Justice and Society: Report of the Legal Commission of 
the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society. Johannesburg: Spro-Cas 
Publication no. 9. 
Sharp, J. 2008. “Fortress SA, Xenophobic Violence in South Africa.” Anthropology 
Today 24 (4): 1–3. 
Shklar, J. 1989. Montesquieu. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
South African Human Rights Commission. 2000. Lindela at the Crossroads for 
Detention and Repatriation. Pretoria: HRC. 
Steytler, N. C. 1987. “Criminal Justice and the Apartheid State.” In Race and the Law 
in South Africa, edited by A. J. Rycroft, 66–98. Cape Town: Juta. 
Sto er, A. L. 1989a. “Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual 
Morality in 20th c. Colonial Cultures.” American Ethnologist 16 (4): 634–660. 
Stoler,  A.  L.  1989b.  “Rethinking  Colonial  Categories:  European  Communities  and  
the Boundaries of Rule.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (1): 134–
161. 
Strauss, L. 1987. Natural Right and History. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Supiot, A. 2007. Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of the Law. 
New York: Verso. 
Wacks, R. 1984. “Judges and Injustice.” South African Law Journal 101: 266–285. 
Wa wo, R. 1996. “The Formation of Natural Law to Justify Colonialism 1539–1689.” 
New Literary History 27 (4): 743–759. 
 
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
